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Sustainable International Investment Law After the Pax 
Americana: The BOOT On the Other Foot 
 
 
David Collins 
 
ABSTRACT: An increasing proportion of outward foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) 
now originates from emerging market economies. This represents a new stage of 
globalization that appears to have resulted in modifications to the existing regime of 
international investment law, created largely to serve the needs of Western 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the 20th Century. This article will examine some 
trends in international investment law that may indicate a rejection of liberalization in 
favour of greater control by host states, some aspects of which should be viewed in a 
positive light because of their acknowledgement of important public interest concerns. 
While these regulatory restrictions on FDI may not have been pursued specifically to 
disadvantage emerging market MNEs, these firms may face difficulties that their 
western counterparts did not, in large part because of greater recognition of the need 
for sustainability in international investment policy, entrenching so-called ‘first mover 
advantage’.  The article concludes by recommending greater use of partnerships 
between host states and foreign investors as well as a balanced approach to the 
interpretation of FDI-restrictive laws. 
 
 
 
I   INTRODUCTION: FDI FLOWS TOWARDS EQUILIBRIUM 
The rapidly emerging economies of Asia, Latin America and Africa are poised to 
become the dominant economic powers of the 21st Century, possibly overtaking many 
of the largest advanced economies of the West, including Germany, the United 
Kingdom and even the United States.  China’s decade of unprecedented growth has 
already led it to surpass Japan as the world’s second largest economy.  India will 
shortly become the most populated country in the world, with a relatively young and 
educated workforce.  Brazil has begun to harness its resource wealth and embrace a 
market economy to become a major economic power within Latin America.  Many of 
these so-called “southern” states are achieving economic maturity, marked notably by 
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rising GDP per capita as well as receipt and, importantly for the purposes of this 
article, export of foreign direct investment (‘FDI’). Recent data on the flows of 
outward FDI from emerging market states reflects the appearance and rise of the 
emerging market multinational enterprises (‘MNE’)s on the world stage that had once 
been dominated by American, Japanese and European companies.  
FDI from developing countries accounted for approximately one quarter of 
global FDI outflows in 2010 but has been the focus of limited legal academic 
commentary, primarily from the fields of business and international relations.1  In that 
sense it could be stated that the ascendency of emerging market MNEs has occurred 
to some extent unobserved by the West, which appears to remain pre-occupied with 
exporting FDI to the emerging states in order to take advantage of their burgeoning 
middle class.  Yet outward FDI from the non-Western world is accelerating relatively 
more rapidly, and was also more quick to rebound from the global financial crisis of 
2008-10 than that of FDI from developed countries.2  FDI from emerging economies 
is rising at a relatively faster rate and may ultimately equal or exceed that of Western 
firms.  MNEs from the emerging markets are globalizing at a faster pace than their 
developed world counterparts, at an earlier stage of their existence, and there are no 
indications that this will abate in the near future.3  The Boston Consulting Group 
claims that fifty of the firms listed in its annual compilation of “Global Challengers”, 
meaning firms from rapidly emerging economies, will qualify for inclusion on 
Fortune’s highly regarded list of the 500 largest companies in the world.4 This reveals 
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both the large quantity of capital held by emerging market MNEs, often backed 
directly by their home country governments, as well as the dynamic nature of these 
firms that appear less troubled by the risks that Western firms have associated with 
internationalization, such as political unrest and legal instability in host states.  While 
Western MNEs will continue to invest abroad in Asia and Latin America, as well as in 
Europe and other developed regions, this will occur alongside and in ever- 
intensifying competition with MNEs from the emerging markets.  Whereas 20th 
Century globalisation was associated with the establishment by Western firms of 
international markets for their goods and the acquisition of raw materials or low cost 
manufactured products overseas, these new shifts in capital movement represent what 
could be described as the defining characteristic of 21st Century globalisation. The 
description of this new paradigm of international commercial activity as a kind of 
reverse economic neo-colonialism is compelling: emerging markets may ultimately 
influence western society including not just economic impacts but possibly also 
cultural ones.5  As with the economic expansion of the 20th Century, there is a danger 
that vulnerable groups will suffer from this process. 
It is not difficult to suppose that many Western countries, now more aware of 
environmental and social harms that can occur as a consequence of unrestrained 
growth, will be hostile to this shift.  These countries may consequently attempt to 
arrest this process through the same systems of international investment law that had 
once underpinned their expansionary interests.  This is ironic because the success of 
emerging market investors has occurred largely because of principles of international 
investment law developed to serve Western investors during the Pax Americana.6 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to debate the issue, this period is thought 
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by some to have concluded following a series of events in the first decade of the 21st 
Century heralding the decline of the US, including the 2001 terrorist attacks against 
the US as well as the global financial crisis of 2008-10.7  At the height of American 
economic power and influence, the home states of western companies, established 
largely one-sided international investment agreements (‘IIA’s) that protected their 
investors from the regulatory actions of host states overseas, often in the developing 
world.  Emerging market investors have begun to use these investor-friendly 
agreements to suit their objectives.  Many of these may be counter to the interests of 
the West as host state recipients fearful of competition with more efficient producers, 
as well as mindful of non-economic risks such as environmental degradation and 
unemployment.  The international legal framework governing international 
investment is undergoing a process of adaptation to this new global order in which 
capital flows both ways.  Whereas IIAs had once been predominately pro-investor, 
these instruments are now tend to take a more balanced approach to the delineation of 
the rights and obligations of investors and host governments.  Importantly, they also 
include provision for public policy goals to protect the interests of vulnerable groups.  
This more restrained approach of international investment law, seen by some 
as a departure from the dominant Washington Consensus model of governance rooted 
in free markets8, is not necessarily differentially disadvantageous to foreign over local 
investors.  Many of the changes in international investment law that will be discussed 
below affect domestic firms equally because they facilitate domestic legislation 
applicable to all firms regardless of origin.  In this way, the observed pull-back in 
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investor protections in favour of tighter regulation should be viewed as a way of 
developed countries entrenching “first mover advantage” for their own firms.  
Western firms were able to obtain market dominance because they were able to 
flourish during period when there was less government intervention and greater 
protection for foreign investors abroad, as enshrined in many older IIAs.  Western 
firms can preserve this advantage with respect to the emerging market MNEs because 
these new firms will face a much less hospitable regulatory environment, with weaker 
protections for foreign investors. 
This article will attempt to illustrate some of the ways in which the existing 
regime of international investment law has begun to undergone a transformation in 
response to the shift in FDI flows from East to West, or what might be described as 
the 21st Century phase of globalization.  It will suggest that, at least in some 
circumstances, the re-adjustments that have been observed in international investment 
law should be viewed in a positive light, particularly because of their facilitation of 
domestic regulation that addresses the needs of important social concerns, embodying 
what might be described as sustainable international investment.  These changes are 
welcome provided that they do not lead to undue protectionism, which could impede 
FDI flows and have devastating effects on the global economy.  This article will 
outline five main categories of change that have resulted in more restrictive climate 
for international investment: investor-state arbitration, political risk insurance, capital 
transfer, public interest exceptions, and the definitions of investment and 
expropriation. It will conclude by offering two very brief recommendations to 
maintain high levels of FDI flows while preserving some of the policy advances that 
have been made as a consequence of the observed changes. 
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II.   FALTERING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
The World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(‘ICSID’) is now the pre-eminent system of arbitration for the resolution of disputes 
between foreign investors and the host states in which they invest.9 As of 2011, 144 
states had become parties to the convention. ICSID has been so well-received 
investors because it provides a recognized, neutral forum for dispute settlement of 
investment related matters with a standardized procedure and institutional support.  
Encouragingly, China has demonstrated a willingness to enlarge its participation in 
international arbitration to matters beyond simply the quantification of compensation, 
as it had done in the past, as demonstrated in its recent BIT with the Netherlands in 
which it directs investor-state disputes to ICSID, or an UNCITRAL tribunal.10  Thus 
far American and European MNEs have been the dominant complainants in ICSID-
based arbitrations, although the myth of an anti-developing country bias in ICSID 
decisions has been dispelled through empirical studies,11 suggesting that it is both fair 
and effective.    
 Still, perception of ICSID’s fairness as a forum for investment dispute 
settlement may count for more than reality. Bolivia and Ecuador have withdrawn from 
the ICSID Convention, possibly because of the sizable awards that had been levied by 
the tribunal against Argentina in the early 2000s.  While China and other large 
emerging markets such as Mexico and South Africa have now ratified the Convention, 
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Brazil, India and Russia have yet to do so.12 Although ICSID’s Additional Facility 
Rules allow for non-parties (or their investors) to use it provided that at least one of 
the two parties is a member, these hold-outs may be cause for concern in the future.  If 
ICSID ceases to remain the dominant forum for investor state dispute settlement, then 
much of the jurisprudence that it has developed may begin to unravel, undermining 
some of predictability that FDI relies upon. ICSID continues to develop a growing 
body of arbitration decisions, which although not strictly precedential in nature, tend 
to demonstrate legal consistency and policy coherence.13  Most worrying in this 
regard is the recent statement from the Australian government that it will no longer 
include provision for international investor state arbitration in its IIAs, as this would 
offer foreign investors the potential for remedies that would be unavailable to 
domestic investors.14  In the belief that the local courts of signatory states are adequate 
to deal with foreign investors’ complaints, the Australia-US FTA does not contain a 
dispute settlement provision.  There is concern that Australia’s apprehension may 
spread. Moreover, criticisms concerning ICSID’s narrow annulment provision and 
inconsistent decisions issued by annulment committees, as well as tribunals, persist.15 
The debate continues regarding ICSID’s need of an appellate mechanism in order to 
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ensure consistency and predictability.16 These issues have led commentators to 
question the legitimacy of international investment arbitration going forward.17  
 There appears to be a growing trend within the procedure of international 
investment arbitration that, with the objective of enhancing transparency and 
accessibility, might be viewed as anti-investor.  This is tied to the presumption that 
public perception of multinational corporations tends to be more negative than 
positive and as such greater transparency will be against the interests of firms.  Given 
the growing influence of the anti-globalization movement, it is unlikely that the 
general public will take the side of foreign investors against governments when 
disputes arise. Increased transparency is seen in the growing commonality of amicus 
curiae briefs,18 and the increased regularity of publication of decisions.19  The 
strongest opposition to mandatory transparency in UNCITRAL arbitrations, for 
example, has been voiced by industrialized states such as France and Germany and 
China, home of many of the world’s largest corporations. In contrast, developing 
countries have remained silent on this matter, reflecting their awareness that increased 
transparency could be advantageous to them as respondents.  
These developments are antithetical to the confidential nature of arbitration 
process that had originally made it an attractive method of dispute settlement for 
companies.  Whereas investor-state arbitration had been a largely secretive procedure, 
disseminated only sporadically through ICSID’s incomplete and non-user friendly 
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website, investment arbitration decisions and awards are now comparatively well-
reported on the internet and widely debated through blogs and other on-line fora.  In 
many instances this information has given anti-globalization organizations a focus for 
attack.  Dissenting opinions of investment arbitrators are also now regularly 
published.20 While dissents could equally favour investors as states, coupled with 
increased transparency the presence of readily accessible dissent judgments may 
exacerbate public resentment towards an investor even if it is has won a claim by 
presenting a reasoned argument to the contrary.  If MNEs fail to conform to the 
pressure to comply with the growing emphasis on transparency in ICSID and other 
mechanisms, they risk damaging their public reputations in a now very conspicuous 
manner. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the heightened openness of 
investor state dispute settlement, which should itself be viewed as a step towards 
legitimacy and inclusiveness as components of sustainability, might end up 
undermining foreign investor’s access to justice. This could shift the balance of power 
in the procedure in favour of state parties, the natural champions of the broader 
public. Worse, it could alienate MNEs from the investment arbitration process 
altogether.  Investors may ultimately respond by insisting on private contractual 
arrangements with governments that specify recourse to the local courts of their home 
state.  Eager to attract FDI, host states may be pressured to accept such terms. 
 Investor-state dispute settlement has been dealt a further blow by the 
elimination of umbrella clauses in Western IIAs.  Umbrella clauses grant foreign 
investors the right to international arbitration for breaches of the relevant treaty as 
well as breaches of any other obligations undertaken by the state. This guarantee is 
often extended to private contractual matters, elevating them to the level of a treaty 
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violation.  The elimination of the umbrella clause arguably focuses claims in order to 
safeguard host states that do not have the resources to litigate investment disputes at 
multiple fora concurrently. In that sense it protects countries from vexatious claims, 
achieving equality of arms between powerful corporations and vulnerable developing 
states.  The removal of umbrella clauses also allows host states to avoid international 
arbitration in a wide range of circumstances, such as breach of contract with the 
foreign investor, forcing the investor to use local court procedures, the avoidance of 
which is one of the central purposes of international arbitration. Unlike its earlier 
version, the newer US Model BIT does not contain an umbrella clause, protecting the 
US government from facing international arbitration for violations of commitments 
that are not captured in the text of its IIAs.  This change deprives foreign investors of 
one of their most powerful tools: access to neutral international dispute settlement as 
an alternative to possibly biased, expensive and non-confidential local courts.  
 As an alternative to treaty arbitration, the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s 
state-to-state dispute settlement grievance procedure will offer limited recourse to the 
emerging states that seek an agenda of liberalized FDI.  Wide-ranging reservations are 
still maintained by WTO Members over incoming FDI in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), which covers FDI through the commercial presence mode 
of delivery of services, facilitating market access and prohibiting discrimination based 
on nationality.21  The GATS has failed to liberalize trade in key services, with many 
states maintaining minimum foreign ownership requirements on enterprises in sectors 
such as telecommunications and banking.  For example, the US places numerous 
domestic citizenship and registration requirements on foreign banks seeking 
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establishment within its territory,22  and some countries in the European Union require 
the authorization of their Ministers of Finance to allow mergers and acquisitions by 
entities outside the European Community.23  Given limited specific commitments 
under GATS relating to FDI, there is little room to bring a WTO claim against 
developed states seeking removal of an offensive measure as alternative to cash 
compensation through investor-state arbitration.  This is particularly problematic as 
services investment continues to grow in proportion to manufacturing and extraction 
as a leading source of FDI, which had been the dominant sectors in the 20th Century.  
From the perspective of an emerging market MNE, the lack of access to effective 
dispute settlement, either through investor-state arbitration or through WTO’s state-
to-state mechanism, could represent an unfortunate barrier to continued growth 
because of the increased risk of inadequate legal redress. This disadvantage is one that 
their competitors from the developed world were largely spared from in the late 20th 
Century when investor-state arbitration clauses began to appear in BITs. Of course the 
extent to which the availability of international arbitration actually affects an 
investor’s decision where to invest is uncertain, however it can be expected that 
jurisdictions for which this option is unavailable will appear less attractive. 
 
III) LACK OF AVAILABILITY OF POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE 
A second significant barrier to the success of FDI from emerging markets, at least in 
relation to that directed at the developing world, is the lack of availability of political 
risk insurance (‘PRI’). This problem will be felt more acutely by MNEs from 
emerging markets than by their western counterparts because of the greater familiarity 
that developed country firms have with these processes. PRI products have been 
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largely designed by organizations that are now sensitive to non-economic matters 
such as indigenous people’s rights and environmental protection.  The Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank mandates consideration of 
these issues in its policies, as do many of the regional development banks.  Now many 
private investment insurance providers in the West insist on environmental or other 
performance assessments, often under the rubric of socially responsible guidelines 
such as those promulgated by non-governmental organizations.  Such principles have 
been embraced by Western institutions in response to a growing awareness within 
civil society, spearheaded by increasingly powerful lobby groups, that subordinates 
economic progress to sustainability concerns. While adhering to these often complex 
and administratively onerous guidelines may be less problematic for firms from China 
because of its large state-sponsored system for outward FDI, firms from smaller 
emerging markets like Turkey and Mexico may struggle to access developing 
countries from their less well-funded domestic PRI providers without MIGA support.  
The result is that existing dominant western MNEs that have grown accustomed to 
sustainability-based processes have a distinct advantage over non-western MNEs 
when it comes to lucrative FDI possibilities in high-risk countries, such as the 
numerous resource rich African states.  
While MNEs from emerging markets have shown less sensitivity to political 
risk than their developed country counterparts, the availability of PRI may grow in 
importance given the increasing involvement of emerging market firms in high-risk 
areas. Few firms from the large emerging markets of Brazil, India and China use PRI 
at all, although it is common in Russia, possibly because of the higher risks associated 
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with extractive industry investment compared to services-oriented investment.24  With 
the exception of China, very few emerging economies maintain PRI providers with 
significant levels of capitalization. The low priority for the insurance of non-
commercial risks as a home state policy in emerging economies may reflect the 
relative scarcity of potential investors: these states did not need to create 
institutionalized PRI insurance schemes because there were insufficient investors to 
make use of them. MNEs from developing countries may also be more familiar with 
unfavourable conditions in their home states and as such have gained greater 
experience operating in politically unstable environments with corrupt bureaucracies. 
Yet as MNEs from emerging market countries expand overseas and face oppressive 
regulation and civil unrest in developing host states, they may be more inclined to 
seek PRI, such as that offered by the MIGA or other regional development banks.  It 
is thought that PRI guarantees from international agencies like the World Bank’s 
MIGA are viewed as inaccessible by emerging market firms because the process of 
obtaining it is too cumbersome relative to the coverage obtained.25 Indeed, the often 
exhaustive process for obtaining PRI from many development banks would appear to 
favour Western firms that are accustomed to requirements such as the performing of 
environmental impact assessments or engaging in consultations with local citizens.26  
Many development banks also maintain grievance procedures for citizens that have 
been adversely affected by the operations of foreign investors,27 and while these are 
usually optional, pressure to participate in these processes could result in 
apprehension among MNEs from countries that are not familiar with this level of 
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public involvement in the investment process. Many of these screening and 
monitoring features should be welcomed as a positive method of assessing projects 
that may be harmful to host states and as a way of empowering stakeholder groups. 
However they could represent barriers to emerging market FDI in developing states. 
Thus the goal of sustainability in international investment law could place firms from 
traditional FDI exporting countries at an advantage, at least for a time, when seeking 
investment opportunities in high-risk states. 
 
IV) CAPITAL CONTROLS AND ECONOMIC EMERGENCY MEASURES 
During the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, the International Monetary 
Fund (‘IMF’) has relaxed its stance on the need to preserve free flows of capital 
internationally.28 The IMF’s prohibition on capital controls had been a pivotal 
component of home state policies towards outward FDI.  They played a key role in 
augmenting the FDI from emerging market MNEs as firms from these countries have 
been able to use their domestic currency to fund operations abroad.  There is a danger 
that the legitimization of greater capital controls for the purposes of economic crisis 
aversion could undermine the stability and predictability in the host state’s 
management of its economy, possibly to the detriment of foreign investors. The IMF’s 
greater emphasis on maintaining sovereign liquidity and the maintenance of balance 
of payments equilibrium embraces long-term economic stability over short term 
profits.  It could, however, result in the imposition of domestic measures that are 
harmful to foreign investors, such as abrupt changes a taxation regime or rescission of 
concession contracts.   
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A number of IIAs now specify that states are able to maintain capital controls 
in order to fulfil their obligations under the IMF, including their capacity to maintain 
balance of payments equilibrium. Similarly, the US Model BIT contains an exception 
to its investment protection obligations for measures aimed at preserving the integrity 
of the financial system.29 The GATS contains a safeguard to allow for measures to 
address balance of payments difficulties30 as well as an Annex on Financial Services 
which permits Members to take prudential measures to protect investors that would 
otherwise violate of GATS obligations.31 Japan has IIAs that allow it to impose 
capital controls for its IMF obligations.32 The importance of these provisions can be 
seen in the case of Argentina’s economic crisis of the turn of the millennium. 
Argentina’s success in pleading the defence of economic necessity for currency-
related measures taken during its financial crisis of 2000-01 may pave the way for 
such justifications by developed and developing country host states alike.33 While 
these extensions of permissible government actions may remove scrutiny of economic 
management from private arbitral tribunals accustomed to assessing more routine 
commercial transactions, the result is that investors may not be compensated for 
measures undertaken in the broader economic interest of the host state. 
 Ensuring that governments have the capacity to regulate their economy for the 
purpose of crisis management is an aspect of sustainability in that such decisions are 
intended to preserve the long-term health of society, often at the expense of 
immediate interests such as the performance of contracts or concession agreements 
with foreign companies. These economic sustainability-focused restrictions could 
represent a significant barrier to FDI, precisely at the moment where emerging market 
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 16
firms are enjoying an ascendency.  While this will affect developed country MNEs as 
adversely as their emerging market counterparts, it is worth observing that the 
financial crisis that led to many of these restrictions was a consequence of financial 
policies undertaken in the West. 
 
V)  EXPANSIVE GENERAL EXCEPTIONS  
Among the most restrictive features of modern IIAs are there general exceptions 
relating to public policy interests like the environment, labour, as well as national 
security and culture. Host states may claim that protections provided under their IIAs 
can be forsaken in certain circumstances because of non-FDI related concerns that 
supersede the interests of foreign investors.  It thought by some that MNEs should 
conduct business in a manner that does not harm local communities,34 a view that has 
been advanced considerably through the efforts of muscular NGOs.  In some respects 
this awareness of the need for sustainability in international investment represents a 
more mature stage of capitalism as practiced by the West which has, with the 
affluence created under the Pax Americana, have been able to devote resources social 
policy goals, such as the environment and full employment. Consumers in these 
societies have correspondingly begun to seek products that were created in a 
sustainable manner.  Most notably, the environmentalism movement has grown to 
become a powerful lobbying force, affecting the decisions of government and industry 
alike.  While environmental protection and labour rights preservation are laudable 
goals, they could represent barriers to the flow of FDI because of increased 
compliance costs associated with tighter regulation.  These costs will be 
proportionally greater for firms from countries that do not have strong traditions of 
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labour rights and environmental protection and which consequently struggle to adapt 
to a world that holds multiple values.  Indeed, the improved “governance” associated 
with the application of Western standards to lesser developed countries is often 
viewed as one of the greatest advantages of FDI.  
Explicit sustainability-focused goals are now enshrined in many IIAs. The US 
Model BIT was reformed to recognize the right of states to enact environmental 
laws.35  Express reference to environmental protection is missing from the GATS 
general exceptions, but the agreement does contain a general exception for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health.36  This is repeated in the Canada 
Model BIT and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement.37 NAFTA 
contains a provision which allows countries to enact laws that have an environmental 
purpose, as long as they do not otherwise violate the agreement.38 The International 
Institute for Sustainable Development Model International Agreement for Sustainable 
Development contains strong protections for labour conditions and human rights.39 
The Draft Norway Model BIT, although subsequently withdrawn by the Norwegian 
government, prohibited states from lowering their labour standards to attract 
investment and permits states to regulate for the protection of health and safety.40 
While not an investment agreement, The US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement 
contains extensive obligations for upholding core labour rights such as safe working 
conditions and the right to form unions.41 Some US IIAs reference a desire to promote 
respect for workers’ rights, but they do not contain substantive obligations in this 
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regard.42 The US Model BIT states that parties should strive not to weaken core 
labour rights in their pursuit of FDI.43 
A trend of cultural preservation may also severely restrict FDI into the 
developed world by emerging market firms.  Such principles are particularly 
threatening to emerging market firms seeking to operate in the West because they 
condone discrimination against foreign investors.  Regulations aimed a cultural 
preservation recognize that the cultural practices of some communities are vulnerable 
to foreign influences that result from FDI.  Laws that are hostile to foreign cultural 
influences are commonly associated with oppressive regimes, such as that of China, 
which has faced extensive criticism from the West regarding its harsh censorship of 
the internet44 in order to curtail political dissent.  This environment has been 
problematic some foreign telecommunications companies operating there.  China 
maintains heavy barriers to the entry of foreign films which it justifies through 
cultural preservation,45 restrictions which could also be viewed as attempts to 
safeguard national security.  Cultural censorship is becoming common in the West as 
well.  Canada omits cultural industries entirely from any obligations in its Model 
BIT.46 A similar exception is seen in France’s Model BIT.47 The GATS’ exception for 
measures aimed at protecting the public morals or maintaining public order48 could be 
construed so as to safeguard local culture, protecting many companies in the media 
and entertainment industries. These phrases also appear in Sweden’s BIT with 
                                               
42
 E.g. preamble to U.S. Bolivia BIT (1998) and U.S. Argentina BIT (1994) 
43
 Art 13 
44
 As indicated by comments from the US ambassador to China: see A Jacobs New U.S. Envoy Urges 
China to Relax Business Restrictions THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 September 2011 
45
 See CE Heiberg, American Films in China: An Analysis of China’s Intellectual Property Record and 
Reconsideration of Cultural Trade Exceptions Amidst Rampant Piracy 15 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (2006) 
46
 Art 10.6.  Admittedly, Canada’s cultural restrictions are in some respects less severe today than they 
were in the 1970s. 
47
 Art 1.6 
48
 Art XIV a) 
 19
Russia.49 It should be noted that the ASEAN Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment now includes protections for national treasures of artistic, historic or 
archaeological value.50  The preservation of local culture from foreign influences may 
be viewed as a key aspect of the long-term functioning of a society; however the 
ambiguous nature of the concept of “culture” makes it highly susceptible to abuse by 
governments seeking to disadvantage foreign competitors.  Western MNEs entering 
developing and transition economies in the late 20th century did not face such 
opposition. 
National security has become an established exception to liberalization 
commitments in the 21st Century international investment law, largely as a result of 
the ever-present danger of terrorism.  As with culture, national security concerns 
justify outright discrimination against foreign entrants. The extent to which 
heightened security risks are themselves a consequence of American foreign policy is 
debatable, but clearly the infrastructure of the developed West remains among the 
most prominent targets.  The high-profile blockage of Dubai World takeover of 
several US ports by the US government for national security reasons is perhaps the 
most high profile recent example of security-based barrier to FDI.51 Canada appears to 
be among the worst offenders for rejecting FDI on the basis of its incompatibility with 
domestic interests, including national security as broadly construed.  This fact has not 
escaped media attention in the United States, Canada’s largest trading and investment 
partner.52 The Canadian government recently blocked a bid by US firm to acquire the 
aerospace division of the telecommunications company MacDonald, Dettwiler and 
Associates Ltd. Canada also recently denied the acquisition of a substantial portion of 
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its potash industry by Australia’s BHP Billiton, citing an unwillingness to lose 
sovereignty over its natural resources based on a “net benefit” test contained Canada’s 
foreign investment legislation.53  
Many IIAs now contain an “essential security” exception under which 
signatory states are entitled, notwithstanding other provisions of the treaty, to take 
measures to protect their essential security interests.  In some cases these restrictions 
are self-judging, which means that the host state government alone may decide 
whether the measure taken is necessary given the situation.54 GATS also contains an 
exception which permits Members to disregard obligations relating to services 
liberalization for matters that it (the WTO Member country) considers to be in its 
essential security interests.55 While protecting citizens from attacks is a vital aspect of 
governance, such unilateral regulatory decisions by states could be used in a manner 
designed to illegitimately restrict the investment activities of foreign investors that are 
identified as harmful to local competition.  Indeed, commentators have viewed these 
clauses as indicative of an evisceration of essential investor protections.56  
International oversight of such treaty provisions is unlikely given the sensitive nature 
of these decisions. As such national security based exceptions stand to remain a 
highly contentious and common feature of international investment law in the coming 
decades.   
 Lastly, although it is not strictly speaking a public policy exception, many 
IIAs now contain exceptions for regional investment agreements.  This means that 
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parties are allowed to ignore most favoured nation guarantees against discrimination 
in order to advantage investors from states that are a party to a regional agreement.57 
The purpose of this exception is obvious; firms that would be unable to compete 
globally may be able to compete regionally, a situation that may be offensive to 
emerging market MNEs as they reach the level of major global players. Unlike 
restrictions placed on regional economic integration agreements found in the WTO,58 
these exceptions in IIA typically contain no limitations such as the requirement that 
regional agreements offer greater liberalization or written notification to treaty 
partners.  Regionalism in international investment law, as in trade, is seen by some as 
a barrier to multilateralism, which is widely recognized as more economically 
efficient.59 Such provisions may become common features in Western IIAs as these 
countries seek to protect their companies from more intense global competition. 
 
VI)  NARROWING DEFINITIONS OF INVESTMENT AND EXPROPRIATION 
IIAs are showing a tendency to provide a narrower definition of investment such that 
the protections afforded under the relevant treaty, like national treatment and fair and 
equitable treatment are unavailable to firms that do not conform.  Commentators 
observed an expansive understanding of the notion of investment in the past, as 
enshrined in various IIAs and as considered by arbitration tribunals when determining 
their jurisdiction.60  Most IIAs still define investments broadly as constituting “all 
assets” with several groups of illustrative categories.61  The Washington Convention 
which established ICSID does not contain a definition of investment, an implicit 
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acknowledgement that the concept is a fluid one that changes over time and among 
investing parties. Naturally, newly internationalizing firms will seek to preserve this 
expansive understanding in order to maximize the protection afforded to the full range 
of their commercial activities abroad.  However more recent IIAs have retreated from 
this position. For example, the 2004 US Model BIT narrows the definition of 
investment by excluding claims for payment that do not create rights protected under 
domestic law.62  Clearly this could limit the scope of claims brought against the US 
government by foreign firms accustomed to acquiring commercial rights through their 
domestic legal systems.  
Few western-conceived IIAs use definitions of investor that explicitly include 
state owned enterprises (SOE)s, an omission that has been criticized by commentators 
for failing to reflect the reality of investment structures in non-market economies.63 
More problematically ICSID’s jurisdiction does not contemplate SOEs, suggesting 
that such entities might have difficulty bringing claims through ICSID against 
Western countries. Of course the fact that SOEs are not specifically mentioned in a 
treaty does not mean that these structures will not be protected, but it does suggest 
that SOEs will have to argue their entitlement to protections more forcibly than those 
who are free from government involvement.   The bias against government-controlled 
MNE is further seen in the US’ restrictions on the entrance of government owned 
insurance companies in its GATS commitments.64  These restrictions are problematic 
because SOEs contribute an enormous percentage of FDI from India, China and 
Russia. Many of the largest firms in India, China and Russia are SOEs, including 
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India Oil, China’s Sinopec, and Russia’s Gazprom, which are also among the largest 
firms in the world as ranked by Fortune.65  The lack of express coverage for SOEs 
undermines access of some of these countries’ largest investors to the full protections 
enshrined in international investment law.  In one sense this approach reflects the 
different political heritage of these countries where governments have traditionally 
played a much larger role in the economy than the free-enterprise-focused West, 
where much of modern international investment law was created.  The on-going bias 
against SOEs could equally be viewed as an attempt to suppress non-Western firms 
from establishing market dominance in the West.  Suspicions that SOEs are disguised 
agents of foreign policy attempting to secure control over strategic assets exacerbates 
this problem by playing to public discomfort with globalization as well as general 
xenophobia.66 
 In addition to the lack of provision for SOEs, some IIAs specifically exclude 
protections for investments in government services.67 GATS notably excludes 
government services entirely from its ambit. This may reflect a national security 
concern for public-type services like defence, or it might indicate that certain sectors 
are so essential that they cannot be subjected to the risk associated with private, 
foreign providers, who may discontinue business if profits are not forthcoming. The 
omission of government services from the GATS also represents a significant lost 
opportunity for emerging market MNEs, particularly as many of these have 
established dominance through the provision of government goods and services at 
home where governments have an enlarged role in the economy. The WTO’s 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) may alleviate some of the concerns in 
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this regard should its limited membership increase.  The GPA establishes that WTO 
Members which have chosen to become parties to this agreement must not 
discriminate against local goods and service suppliers on the basis of their degree of 
foreign ownership when awarding government contracts.68 Although the GPA is a 
plurilateral (optional) agreement, it currently has only 15 signatory parties, including 
the large economies of the US, Canada, all European countries and Japan as well as 
emerging markets like Hong Kong and Singapore. Unfortunately for emerging market 
firms seeking access to these countries, many of the GPA parties maintain significant 
reservations to their government procurement commitments, particularly at the sub-
central level. For example, some Canadian provincial governments do not include 
highway construction services.69  Japan’s regional governments do not list the 
production, transportation or distribution of electricity.70 A number of US States 
provide no commitments to GPA coverage whatsoever.71   
 Developing states often require that for “investments” to be protected under 
their IIAs, performance requirements may be imposed upon incoming investors, 
which would otherwise represent a departure from the national treatment guarantee. 
This is a way for lesser developed countries to ensure that they gain an economic 
benefit from the presence of the foreign firm, possibly through mandatory use of 
domestic materials, mandatory employment of locals or mandatory exports.  
Emerging markets such as China and India have been required to surrender some of 
the performance requirements they imposed on foreign investors as a condition of 
entry as a result of the WTO Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) 
agreement.  India has demonstrated an aversion to this WTO obligation and it, like 
                                               
68
 Art III 2.a) 
69
 Canada GPA Annex 2, 19 March 2010 (WT/Let/672) 
70
 Japan GPA Annex 2, 1 March 2000 (WT/Let/330) 
71
 USA GPA Annex 2, 16 October 2002 (WT/Let/431) 
 25
China, has refused to include blanket prohibitions of performance requirements in 
their IIAs in order to maximize the economic benefit of the incoming FDI.72 Yet the 
IIAs of the US, Canada and Germany contain performance requirement prohibitions 
that are even wider than those of the TRIMs.73 These prohibitions have no doubt been 
advantageous for investors from these economically powerful states and they should 
also benefit emerging market firms now seeking to expand into these countries. It will 
therefore be interesting to see if the strong performance requirement prohibitions seen 
in some Western IIAs will be limited in subsequent reiterations of these treaties.  For 
example, new investment treaties may need to accommodate “buy American”-type 
provisions that featured in the US economic stimulus package of 2009, much to the 
consternation of Canadian firms seeking to do business in the US.74 It is noteworthy 
that the WTO TRIMs Agreement says nothing about employment, and as such 
mandatory employment for locals by foreign investors could well become a common 
feature of 21st Century Western IIAs, particularly as economies seek to re-balance 
themselves away from reliance on the services sector towards labour intensive 
manufacturing (as is the stated strategy in UK).75 It should also be mentioned that the 
anti-performance requirement provisions in the Canada and US Model BITs contain 
exceptions for incentives that have been granted to foreign firms for the purpose of 
providing local employment,76 the likely beneficiaries of which will be labour 
intensive manufacturing firms. Such policies are indicative of sustainability through 
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diversification – protecting a national economy from shocks due to excessive reliance 
on a particular sector. 
Further evidence of the retreat from the concept of a protected “investment” 
for the purposes of compensation for expropriation can be found in the WTO’s TRIPs 
agreement.  The TRIPs permits compulsory licensing of intellectual property, most 
notably patents for pharmaceutical products, in emergency situations, such as health 
epidemics.77 Although it has a highly worthy aim and one that embodies principles of 
sustainability, this is unquestionably a form of expropriation, which is typically 
prohibited under most IIAs. To capture the benefit of this provision on TRIPs in the 
context of FDI, some developing states, including notably India,78 maintain 
exceptions in their IIAs to its obligation to compensate investors for expropriation 
under these circumstances, re-iterating their TRIPs right to take investor’s property, 
possibly without full compensation when it is needed for the public interest.  This 
circumstance has, until now, been most problematic for Western MNEs that tend to be 
the sources of the intellectual property that is seized in these situations.  However 
India itself is now home to a number of large pharmaceutical companies, notably Dr 
Reddy’s. These companies may seek full compensation in the event that their parents 
are taken in TRIPs compulsory licensing type situations by other states.  Interestingly, 
the US Model BIT now includes a provision that the obligation to pay full 
compensation does not include TRIPs compulsory licensing situations.79  The US 
might use the TRIPs to produce generic drugs for export to countries that do not have 
the capacity to do so themselves. 
Finally, the scope of expropriation appears to have been narrowed in Western 
IIAs, such as the US Model BIT.  Guarantees against expropriation of assets by host 
                                               
77
 Art 31 
78
 E.g. India-Columbia BIT Art 6.7 
79
 Art 6.5 
 27
state governments are among the most crucial feature of international investment 
treaties. The 2004 Model treaty does not use the language of “tantamount to 
expropriation” seen in the earlier US treaty and which is contained in many US and 
European IIAs with capital importing states. Under the newer US Model instrument, 
claims of expropriation by foreign investors are subject to a three-factor balancing test 
which requires consideration of the economic impact of the government’s action, the 
extent to which it interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations 
and the character of the government action.80 This strict assessment clearly allows 
greater discretion on the part of the host government to act in a manner that could 
interfere with the foreign investor’s activities.  In contrast, earlier understandings of 
indirect expropriation, contained in US and other IIAs were expansive, encompassing 
almost unlimited measures by home states that could undermine the profitability of 
the investor’s assets.81 The sustainability-focus of this change is clear: governments 
should be allowed greater freedom to enact measures that serve wider social purposes 
because such concerns are often more important than short-term economic targets. 
The effect of the narrowing is that foreign investors pursuing opportunities in the 
United States will have a much more difficult time proving expropriation and thereby 
obtaining compensation for governmental interference. This is a distinctly different 
environment than that faced by US companies operating in developing states in 
previous decades.  While the change does demonstrate a welcome embrace of 
important policy goals, signifying a more mature, socially conscious approach to 
governance, unduly restricting the capacity to claim expropriation raises the risk of 
abusive over-regulation, arguably intended to suppress the economic activity of rivals. 
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VII.   CONCLUSION:  BALANCING HOME AND HOST STATE INTERESTS WITH 
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT 
Developed country MNEs have thrived under global economic institutions established 
by the Pax Americana; the Bretton Woods trio of the WTO, IMF and World Bank, as 
well as the network of bilateral and regional treaties that have established a de facto 
body of international investment law.  It remains to be seen what changes will be 
made to this legal regime by both the developed and emerging world in response to 
the rapid rise of FDI from emerging markets as well as the growing recognition that 
crucial non-economic goals must be served.  The strong protections afforded foreign 
investors such as wide definitions of investment, guarantees against expropriation and 
access to international arbitration will be sought by emerging market MNEs just as 
America and Europe attempt to undermine them in their new roles as “host states” 
vulnerable to foreign competition.  Developed countries appear to be pulling back on 
the liberal principles that facilitated 20th Century globalization, possibly even by 
exploiting the recent global financial crisis, terrorism, climate change mitigation and 
resistance to state-intervention in the economy as justifications for tighter control of 
inward FDI.  Ironically concern for these important issues in the West, even where 
legitimate, may be the consequence of the very affluence that less restrained 
capitalism was able to provide.  Still, rising MNEs from emerging markets should not 
expect to be able to transgress crucial goals of sustainable international investment, 
including protection of the environment as well as labour and national security, 
simply because their Western counterparts may have been oblivious to this in past.  
Whether or not the trend of de-liberalization discussed herein is an intentional strategy 
by Western states to undermine the competitiveness of emerging market firms is 
admittedly conjecture: it is unlikely that governments would admit to this openly, 
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although such statements would undoubtedly satisfy some lobby groups (including 
both NGOs and MNEs).  Some of the restrictive features discussed herein were in 
place during the period that might be described as the peak of global economic 
liberalism.  Still it is clear that modern MNEs, including new entrants from the 
developing world, will face a different regulatory landscape than many of the most 
successful American, European and Japanese firms did in the previous century.  It is 
important to recognize that local firms in developed states will, in many instances, 
face the same regulatory barriers as foreign firms seeking to enter these regions.  
However, many of the sustainability-focused impediments discussed above were not 
in place in the 20th Century.  As such Western firms were able to establish dominance 
during a period in that was quite simply more conducive to economic activity. This 
first-mover advantage could allow Western MNEs to maintain dominance over their 
emerging market competitors. As the 20th Century labels of “home” and “host” states 
become meaningless in a world in which FDI flows from East to West tend towards 
equilibrium, a more balanced approach to the standards that inform the international 
regulation of FDI must ultimately be taken; one that is sensitive to public interest 
concerns that affect the citizens of host states and more flexible in terms of national 
policy space. This article has identified some areas of contention without attempting 
to formulate comprehensive solutions, but some potential resolutions could be briefly 
mentioned.   
First, arbitration tribunals called upon to interpret some of the FDI-restrictive 
provisions in newer IIAs could consider employing a WTO GATT style chapeau 
test:82 is the domestic measure actually a disguised restriction to foreign investment?  
This language is seen already in the US Model BIT in relation to its various public 
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policy exceptions.83 This assessment could be combined with some kind of 
proportionality test,84 along with an investigation into whether a less investment-
restrictive method of achieving the stated policy aim was available.  At the same time 
FDI promotion initiatives must include raising awareness of PRI schemes and what is 
required to obtain them. International arbitration must remain transparent, with 
reasonably restrictions for confidential information. ICSID’s legitimacy could be 
further enhanced with a badly needed appeals mechanism, which may lend greater 
utility to the increasingly common dissent opinions. Lastly, and perhaps most 
creatively, some of the observed conflict between policies that are conducive to 
inward or outward FDI as well as attentive to principles of sustainability may be 
mitigated by the encouragement of more partnerships between foreign investors and 
local industry and or governments, with profits shared between all parties, as well as 
possibly with citizen groups.  Asian-style Build Own Operate Transfer agreements (or 
‘BOOT’s as they are often described) could act as suitable models in this regard.85   
BOOTs are a form of project finance in which a the investor, which may be a 
foreign firm, designs and constructs a project or facility, such as a road or airport, is 
granted ownership over it by the host government and operates it as a business for a 
specified period.  After this title to the project is transferred to the government at a 
previously agreed upon or market price.  The core of the BOOT concept is the private 
investor’s obligation to construct the facility and then operate it.  Financing for the 
project can be provided by a combination of private investments and loans from many 
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sources, including private banks, however in many cases financing comes directly 
from the host government. Government involvement often insures that the investor 
will recover all their construction and operational costs.  BOOTs and similar project 
finance structures were most popular for infrastructure projects in developing 
countries in the mid 1990s, but became much less so after the Asian financial crisis of 
the latter part of that decade.  The BOOT structure requires close government 
involvement in the transaction, whereas a feature of economic governance of many 
countries in recent decades has been the de-coupling of government control over the 
economy in favour of a regulatory model.  The usefulness of BOOTs has been 
therefore limited, at least in mature economies.  Greater government participation in 
FDI, which appears to underpin many of the observed modifications of IIAs discussed 
above, could fit with this project finance structure. 
BOOTs should also appeal to foreign investors.  One of the reasons that 
BOOT arrangements have been so popular for infrastructure related projects in 
emerging Asian countries such as Thailand and Vietnam is because they mandate 
cooperation between the foreign investor and the host state partner, limiting some of 
the risk that the project will fail, while spreading profits if it is successful.  There is 
also no need to extend national treatment to the pre-investment stage, as the terms of 
the project are set through negotiation with the local partner that provides the 
investment capital.86 The government or local partner then recoups this cost by 
charging private purchasers for the use of the service, such as electricity or water 
services. While some BOOT arrangements have resulted in disputes, notably that 
related to the Dhabhol energy project in India, arbitration over the value of the 
investment is generally less likely because the transfer price has been pre-established.  
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It is conceivable that BOOT-type arrangements could become the customary mode of 
entry for emerging market MNEs seeking to do business in North America and 
Europe in certain infrastructure sectors, such as telecommunications, transportation 
and utilities.  Such participation could address some of the concerns relating to 
national security and culture, and could facilitate the control of potentially harmful 
aspects of investment projects, such as environmental damage.  Greater governmental 
involvement in the economy, as demonstrated by auto-sector and financial sector 
assistance may herald the suitability of BOOT-type approaches to FDI. BOOT 
arrangements have been recommended as a way of facilitating infrastructure 
improvements in the US, such as highways and bridges.87  Such arrangements would 
provide emerging market partners with insight into the rising awareness of public 
interest issues, as well as how to obtain PRI and deal with the exigencies of more 
transparent investor-state dispute settlement, by giving them the assistance of a local 
partner. This might help address some of the dissonance between inward and outward 
FDI policies as well as safeguard vulnerable groups that have suffered in the past as a 
consequence excessive investment liberalization. Such project-specific arrangements 
may ultimately become the dominant mode of FDI in developed host states as they 
have been in Asia, paving the way towards uniformity as well as sustainability in 
international investment law, which for the time being appears to be weighed against 
the interests of emerging market firms seeking opportunities in the West. When this 
time arrives, (risking an irresistible extension of the conceit) the proverbial BOOT 
will truly be on the other foot.  
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